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Krithika Ashok,* Paul T. Babie,** & John V. Orth*** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the relationship between justice needs and 
private property in the constitutional takings provisions of the Indian, 
Australian, and American constitutions. Building upon established 
scholarship, it develops a theoretical framework within which to 
consider the way in which a state balances the requirement to provide 
minimal levels of justice for its citizens through the re-distribution of 
goods and resources with the need to protect the private property of 
individuals. We summarize this framework in what we refer to as the 
“Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property Continuum.” Using the 
framework developed, the Article provides an outline of the takings 
provisions found in the Indian, Australian, and American constitutions. 
Part I examines Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which 
contains the scope of the power of compulsory acquisition exercised by 
the Indian state. Part II assesses Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian 
Constitution which, unlike its American and Indian counterparts, 
operates as both a grant of power to the federal government, as well as 
a limitation imposed upon that power, which may, it seems, operate so 
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as to provide some minimal protection for individual private property 
interests. Part III considers the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution which, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, provides perhaps the most robust means among the three 
jurisdictions considered for protecting the individual private property 
interests as against state takings. The Conclusion offers comparative 
reflections on the nature of the takings provision found in each 
jurisdiction. 
 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................999 
I.   INTRODUCTION ........................................................1000 
II.   INDIA: ARTICLE 300A ..............................................1006 
III.  AUSTRALIA: SECTION 51(XXXI) ...........................1019 
IV.  UNITED STATES: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT .......1030 
V.   CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS ..1036 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every system of government implements a means of allocating 
scarce goods and resources amongst its citizens. Political theory, 
starting with Plato, addresses this allocative question as part of the 
overarching mechanism of governance, typically referring to whatever 
means are adopted as a system of property.1 For the most part, that sub-
set of political theory known as property theory has developed ideal-
typical forms of property, generally known as private, state-public, and 
common.2 Virtually all such theorizing fixes the theoretical substantive 
content of these ideal types and, having done so, offers some 
justification for the allocation of scarce resources according to one of 
the ideal types.3 Property theory, then, concerns itself with the 
substantive content of and justifications for the implementation of the 
ideal types in a given system of governance, be it capitalist or 
socialist/communist, or some hybrid of the two. And every system of 
 
1. See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, MINERVA’S OWL: THE TRADITION OF WESTERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2010); J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996). 
2. For more on the content of these ideal-typic forms, see generally Paul T. Babie, John 
V. Orth, & Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, The Honoré-Waldron Thesis: A Comparison of the Blend 
of Ideal-Typic Categories of Property in American, Chinese and Australian Land Law, 91 
TULANE L. REV. 739 (2017). 
3. For justifications typically given for property, see generally BRUCE H ZIFF, PRINCIPLES 
OF PROPERTY LAW (7th ed., 2018). 
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governance exhibits some blend of the ideal types; this is known as its 
system of property, which tends to become a part of its legal structure. 
The theory of property, when so implemented, becomes the state’s law 
of property.4 
As part of a state’s law of property, some consideration is 
typically also given to the re-allocation or re-distribution of goods and 
resources initially allocated to others according to law, so as to meet 
some minimal level of justice for all citizens. J.W. Harris refers to this 
dimension of property law as its “[e]xpropriation [r]ules,” “whereby 
part or all of the privileges and powers constituting a person’s 
ownership of something may be stripped from him against his will.”5 
The state may establish such rules as a means of enforcing the payment 
of debts in processes of civil execution or bankruptcy, or as part of 
family law, or criminal law, or, as part of equity, as a means of 
preventing unconscionable conduct.6 But “[m]ost significantly of all, 
the governments of modern States have asserted the power, enshrined 
in law, to tax money and other property-holdings owned by citizens, 
and to purchase property-holdings compulsorily.”7 The reason for such 
rules is simply because “[i]f property institutions are justifiable at all, 
then at least some of the rules whereby what a person owns may be 
taken from him against his will are justified. . . . [because] justice has 
inevitable costs.”8 
For Harris, “justice costs” are those which arise as part of a 
community’s “obligations to discharge basic needs,” and may be of two 
types: direct and indirect.9 In the former category, one finds those 
arrangements that emerge when “citizens or groups . . . , in justice, 
demand . . . from their fellows . . . that they not be subjected to 
unprovoked violence, [which gives rise to the] . . . need [for] 
legislators, prosecutors, police, soldiers, judges, and social workers.”10 
The most practical method of providing for such services is through 
expropriatory taxation of money for the payment of salaries.11 Indirect 
justice costs, by contrast, include “collective goods,” such as roads, 
parks, museums, and so forth, and basic needs, such as those provided 
 
4. For more on this blend, see Babie, Orth, & Weng, supra note 2. 
5. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 37. 
6. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 37, 38. 
7. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 38. 
8. See HARRIS, supra note 1, 
9. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 279. 
10. See HARRIS, supra note 1, 
11. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 280. 
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for in Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which reads: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.12 
The justice costs of a state, therefore, both direct and indirect, 
must be met through Harris’s expropriation rules, which allow for some 
re-allocation or re-distribution of existing property holdings to the 
state. And while every state accomplishes such re-allocation 
differently, two typical features emerge. First, one finds some form of 
paramount law, usually in a constitution, which provides for a 
balancing of the interests/rights of those whose property interests are 
taken, expropriated or compulsorily acquired by the state with those of 
the state in meeting its justice costs. And, second, having provided the 
means by which the competing interests involved in an expropriation, 
the constitution or other paramount law establishes the branch of 
government charged with mediating disputes between the property 
holder whose interest is taken and the state in seeking to meet its justice 
costs through the application of the constitutional provision so 
established for that purpose. Most states task the judicial branch with 
this mediating role. The role of the courts, in every jurisdiction which 
provides for governmental action so as to redistribute property to meet 
the minimal requirements of justice, is, as Justice Kennedy recently 
wrote, “to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.’”13 
What emerges, then, is a tension between, on the one hand, the 
power of the state to take property interests so as to meet its minimal 
justice (direct and indirect) costs, and, on the other, the protection of 
private property interests held by citizens. We plot those two positions 
at opposite ends of a Continuum.14 The closer a state moves, in its 
paramount law (i.e., its constitution) and its law of property towards 
 
12.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 
1948).  
13. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
14.  See infra Diagram 1.   
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either end of the Continuum, the greater the paramountcy a state places 
on that interest: either meeting the justice needs of the community as a 
whole, at one end of the Continuum, or providing strong protection for 
individual private property interests, at the other. We call that end of 
the Continuum where paramountcy is given to the state’s power 
compulsorily to acquire a “Strong Power of the State Compulsorily to 
Acquire Property to Meet Justice Needs,” and that position at the 
opposite end a “Strong Protection for Private Property.” The center of 
the Continuum is that position where there is a balance between the 
two, and therefore we refer to that as the “Balance Between the State’s 
Power Compulsorily to Acquire Property to Meet Justice Needs and 
the Protection of Private Property.” 
Any state can be plotted along this Continuum, at least initially, 
on the basis solely of its paramount law and its law of property. But 
once that initial position is established, a state may adjust that position 
through the interpretation of its paramount law and its law of property 
by government. This may occur through any of executive, legislative, 
or judicial activity of the state in question; most typically, though, 
judicial interpretation and application of the paramount law and the law 
of property results in the most dramatic shifts of placement on the 
Continuum. Of course, because judicial interpretations and 
applications change over time, a state’s precise placement along the 
Continuum remains in constant flux depending on a then contemporary 
interpretative approach regarding the paramount law and the law of 
property. We call this the “Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property 
Continuum.” 
Diagram 1. Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property 
Continuum 
 
In this Article, we compare the placement of three constitutional 
federal democracies—India, Australia, and the United States—along 
the Continuum, revealing the ways in which the judiciary balances the 
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need for governmental action to redistribute goods and resources so as 
to meet minimal community justice needs/costs as against the 
individual rights established by the property law of the state in those 
goods and resources. In each case, two outcomes follow:  first, the 
relevant constitution contains a provision which establishes the form of 
protection for the established individual property interests of citizens 
combined with some criteria which must be met if the state is to take, 
expropriate, or compulsorily acquire either the goods or resources the 
subject of the individual property rights or the property rights 
themselves; and, second, the judiciary, through its interpretations of 
that constitutional provision, adjusts the balance between the two 
interests of the individual and the state. In our conclusion, we indicate 
where, generally, each of the jurisdictions considered here might fall 
along the Continuum, given the initial placement through the 
constitutional provision and its interpretation by one or more of the 
other branches of government. 
While we provide a brief overview of the operation of the relevant 
constitutional provisions in India, Australia, and the United States, our 
primary focus is the purpose for which property in land may be taken 
by the state (although the approach is generally also applicable to other 
forms of property, both tangible and intangible). Each nation deals 
differently with the question of purpose, thus providing rich 
comparative detail to the variable ways in which a state balances the 
need to meet minimal justice needs/costs against the protection of 
individual private property. Each jurisdiction uses different 
nomenclature to define what Harris refers to as the stripping of property 
interests from an individual for the purpose of meeting a state’s 
minimal justice needs/costs. In the United States, this is referred to as 
a “taking,”15 while in India and Australia, a “compulsory acquisition” 
(or sometimes “expropriation”).16 While both terms mean the same 
thing, so as not to alter beyond recognition the language familiar to 
people in each of those jurisdictions, we use the relevant nomenclature 
for the state’s stripping of individual private property interests for the 
 
15.  See generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying 
Principles--Part I--A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 
(1989); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles--Part II--
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property without Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
53 (1990). 
16.  For India, see generally P. K. SARKAR, LAW OF ACQUISITION OF LAND IN INDIA 
(2008). For Australia, see generally MARCUS JACOBS, LAW OF COMPULSORY LAND 
ACQUISITION (2d ed., 2015). 
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jurisdiction under discussion. Thus, to be clear, when speaking of the 
relevant law for the United States, we use “taking,” of India and 
Australia, “compulsory acquisition” or “expropriation”; but in doing 
so, in each case, we mean the state’s stripping of individual private 
property interests or the goods and resources subject to them so as to 
meet minimal justice needs/costs. 
The Article contains four parts. Part I examines Article 300A of 
the Constitution of India (“Indian Constitution”), which contains the 
scope of the power of compulsory acquisition exercised by the Indian 
state. While the Indian Constitution originally sought to protect 
individual property rights, much like the US Constitution, gradually, 
the need to undertake social and economic reform—justice needs—
began to take precedence over individual rights. This led to a dilution 
of the constitutional protections for individual property rights, but 
without simultaneously instituting a system of accountability to ensure 
that the state serves genuine justice needs when exercising its broad 
powers to acquire land. We see that the Indian position on the 
Continuum is a product of both judicial interpretation and application 
and legislative refinement. 
Part II assesses Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution 
which, unlike its American counterpart, operates as both a grant of 
power to the Commonwealth or federal government, as well as a 
limitation imposed upon that power which may, it seems, operate so as 
to provide some minimal protection for individual private property 
interests. We say minimal protection because the limitation, unlike the 
Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, is at least formally 
considered a limitation on legislative competence rather than as an 
individual right. Australia’s approach—seemingly favoring the 
community and its justice needs/costs—emerges entirely from judicial 
interpretation and application. 
Part III considers the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the US Constitution (“Takings Clause”) which, as interpreted by the 
US Supreme Court, provides perhaps the most robust means among the 
three jurisdictions considered for protecting the individual private 
property interests as against state takings. Like Australia, this position 
has been reached almost entirely as a consequence of judicial 
interpretation and application of the Takings Clause. 
Our Conclusion offers comparative reflections on the nature of the 
constitutional provision found in each jurisdiction, suggesting a 
placement on the Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property 
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Continuum, bearing in mind, of course, that our placements are nothing 
more than a tentative and contingent suggestion, given the potential for 
ongoing shifts due to changing interpretation and application of the 
relevant constitutional protection and the property law of the state. As 
we noted above, the placement of each of the states considered here 
and, indeed, of any state which might be plotted along the Continuum, 
is in constant flux. 
II. INDIA: ARTICLE 300A 
The right to property in India is, at present, protected under Article 
300A of the Indian Constitution, which provides that “no person shall 
be deprived of their property, save by authority of law.”17 A literal 
reading of this constitutional provision suggests an intention to protect 
the landowner only from executive fiat, imposing minimal restrictions 
on the power of the state to acquire land. This is in sharp contrast to the 
language adopted in the Indian Constitution in 1950. At that time, the 
Indian Constitution explicitly made the exercise of eminent domain 
subject to the twin requirements of public purpose and compensation. 
Article 31 provided, in addition to the requirement that a law be 
enacted, that “no property . . . shall be acquired for public purposes . . . 
unless the law provides for compensation.”18 This provision however 
became the subject of a series of legal and political battles, as a result 
of which the language of this provision underwent several changes at 
the hands of the legislature through constitutional amendments.19 At 
their core, these battles represented the clash between the reform 
agenda of a newly constituted, socialist state on the one hand, and 
individual property rights on the other. They culminated eventually, in 
1978, with the right to property being relegated to the status of a mere 
statutory right.20 In other words, the preconditions for the exercise of 
eminent domain were now to be dictated by statute alone, the 
enactment of which being the only mandate under Article 300A of the 
Indian Constitution. 
The primary rationale behind this amendment was to protect the 
remaining fundamental rights,21 a need that arose out of the back-and-
 
17.  INDIA CONST. art. 300A.  
18.  INDIA CONST. art. 31.   
19. Namita Wahi, Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, 
943-44 (Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016).  
20.  INDIA CONST., amended by The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. 
21. See GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 421 (1999). 
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forth, during the same time, between the judiciary and legislature on 
the breadth of the powers of the latter to amend the Indian Constitution. 
In the aftermath of the Emergency,22 the successor government was 
amenable to imposing some limits on the power of the legislature to 
amend the Indian Constitution, particularly the fundamental rights.23 It 
however felt very differently about the right to property,24 to protect 
which—worse, equate it with other fundamental rights—was  thought 
decidedly anti-poor.25 This ultimately led to the withdrawal of the 
constitutional protection that had been accorded to property rights. 
In recent times, however, compulsory acquisition, particularly for 
industry and infrastructure, has resulted in widespread displacement 
among tribal and other economically marginalized communities; and 
has thus also been a major source of political conflict. There has 
evidently been a shift in the priorities of the Indian state in terms of 
allocation of resources, with the gradual shift away from socialism; but 
it is the permissive attitude of the judiciary that has made it possible to 
accommodate such diverse priorities. To illustrate this, we focus on the 
judicial construction of “public purpose,” a prerequisite for the exercise 
of eminent domain. We suggest that the judiciary, by allowing the 
legislature the sole prerogative of defining public purpose, has failed to 
ensure that the dilution of property rights is accompanied by allocation 
of resources to genuine justice requirements. 
The judiciary is called upon to decide on the meaning of “public 
purpose” both when the constitutional validity of land acquisition 
legislation is in question, as well as when examining whether executive 
action is within the strictures of the authorizing law. In relation to the 
first task, “public purpose” has been read into Article 300A as a 
precondition for a law that deprives a person of their property to be 
valid;26 and before that, it was explicitly stated as a condition under 
 
22. In 1975, Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of Emergency in India, quick on the heels of the 
Allahabad HC invalidating her election. During this time, Mrs. Gandhi’s government introduced 
a series of constitutional amendments to protect her own election from challenge and ‘to trim’ 
the judiciary. Most significantly, the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 
introduced an amendment to shield all constitutional amendments from judicial review, 
nullifying therefore the decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, which laid down 
the ‘basic structure’ doctrine. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 370–74. 
23.  AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 421–26. 
24.  AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 421–26. 
25.  AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 425–26. 
26.  K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (India). 
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Article 31(2) of the Indian Constitution.27 As a result, any legislation 
that authorizes the acquisition of land can be challenged as 
unconstitutional, if it does not serve any legitimate public purpose.28 
Nonetheless, if one examines the history of the Supreme Court of India 
(“SCI”), it would be apparent that there have been only a few cases 
where the constitutionality of the legislation has been challenged 
successfully, on the grounds that it does not serve any public purpose.29 
In other words, the public purpose requirement has not constrained the 
ability of the state to flex its eminent domain muscles. 
The primary reason is that acquisition laws in India have largely 
been made immune to judicial review through a series of constitutional 
amendments.30 This may appear paradoxical at first, but the fledgling 
Indian state, conceived as one with a socialist bent,31 aspired to 
undertake agrarian reform, in addition to nationalizing key industries. 
Individual property rights were therefore seen as a hindrance, and 
subservient to the aspiration reflected in the Indian Constitution, to 
achieve social and economic justice—the justice requirements. This 
sentiment was seen in the introduction of Articles 31A, 31B and 31C, 
the scope of which we discuss below. 
Nearly as soon as the Indian Constitution was adopted, feudal 
landlords began to employ the individual rights guaranteed thereunder 
so as to resist the efforts of the state to acquire land that was not 
personally cultivated by them for the purpose of redistribution among 
the landless tillers. These land reforms were aimed particularly at 
putting an end to the exploitative revenue system that was in place 
during British rule; which permitted landlords to impose exorbitant 
revenue rates on the tillers (often through layers of parasitical 
intermediaries), even while they paid tax at fixed rate.32 To ensure that 
these acquisition laws were not struck down by the judiciary, the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 introduced Article 31A, to 
shield land reform laws from constitutional challenge, and Article 31B, 
 
27. State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCR 889 (India); INDIA CONST., 
amended by The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. 
28. INDIA CONST. arts. 32, 226. 
29. NAMITA WAHI, ANKIT BHATIA, ET AL., LAND ACQUISITION IN INDIA: A REVIEW OF 
SUPREME COURT CASES FROM 1950 TO 2016 (2017), at 26. 
30.  P.K. Tripathi, Right to Property after 44th Amendment - Better Protected than Ever 
Before, AIR 49, 51 (1980). 
31. AUSTIN, supra note 22, at 425-26.  
32. Sukumar Das, A Critical Evaluation of Land Reforms in India (1950-1995), in 5 LAND 
REFORMS IN INDIA: AN UNFINISHED AGENDA, 30 (B.K. Sinha & Pushpendra eds., 2000). 
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to protect any law incorporated into the Ninth Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution by a constitutional amendment.33 Article 31C was 
introduced later, through the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) 
Act, 1971 (but again, in furtherance of the socialist objectives of the 
Indian state);34 and explicitly saves laws directed at furthering 
particular Directive Principles of State Policy,35 namely redistribution 
of resources and prevention of concentration of wealth.36 Therefore, 
interestingly, the Indian Constitution itself provided for the justice 
requirements that limited individual property rights. 
The result was the SCI has hardly had opportunity to closely 
scrutinize land acquisition laws, whether to determine the underlying 
public purpose or otherwise, even at a time when property rights 
received constitutional protection. Moreover, the result of these 
exemptions (although of noble intention) has been to aid in cultivating, 
over time, a rather permissive attitude within the judiciary towards 
compulsory acquisition by the state. Therefore, an examination of the 
jurisprudence on eminent domain reveals that even before Article 31(2) 
was deleted from the Indian Constitution, the right to property (or any 
of the other fundamental rights, such as equality and liberty, in their 
application to land acquisition) was denuded of much substance. Even 
in the rare case where the judiciary had opportunity to examine whether 
the land acquisition law satisfies the public purpose requirement, it 
chose to defer to the legislature on principle. It consistently maintained, 
from State of Bihar v. Maharaja Kameshwar Singh,37 the earliest case 
on eminent domain, to KT Plantation v. State of Karnataka,38 that the 
 
33.  INDIA CONST. art. 31A, amended by The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; 
INDIA CONST. art. 31B, amended by The Constitution (Ninth Schedule) Act, 1955. 
34.  INDIA CONST. art. 31C, amended by The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 
1971. 
35. The Directive Principles of State Policy were principles meant to guide the governance 
of the country, and are therefore not justiciable. They reflect the socialist and revolutionary 
content of the Constitution. 
36. INDIA CONST. art. 31C. Article 39 of the Constitution of India states: 
 
Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State: The State shall, in particular, 
direct its policy towards securing: [ . . . ] (b) that the ownership and control of the 
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the 
common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment [ . . . ].  
 
INDIA CONST. art. 39. 
37. See State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCR 889 (India). 
38. See K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (India). 
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legislature is the best judge of the meaning of public purpose, and 
absolved itself of the burden of defining the term. The SCI, suggesting 
that it would be “undesirable” to define public purpose,39 only ever 
attempted define public purpose in the most general terms—as a 
purpose that is beneficial to the community,40 or that which is not 
private.41 In other words, the judiciary has failed to discharge its 
obligation to mediate the competing interests involved in 
expropriation. This also left future courts without any conceptual 
understanding of the term public purpose, and kept the state 
permanently free from scrutiny. Further, considering that the chief 
protocol in the reasoning employed by the courts has been deference to 
the legislature, its explication of the so-called public purpose served by 
the law at hand has also often been based on, not any a priori 
understanding of the term, but simply the claims of the legislature. It 
would therefore also be inappropriate to treat any of these cases as 
carrying any precedential value on the question of what is public 
purpose. 
This permissive attitude of the judiciary is seen not only in its 
treatment of the question of public purpose, but also in its interpretation 
of the scope of exemption provisions. For instance, in KT Plantation v. 
State of Karnataka,42 the SCI when interpreting the immunity granted 
under Article 31A to laws authorizing the acquisition of estates, the 
court gave an expansive reading to the term “agrarian reforms” to 
include the mere preservation and protection of the rich forestry and 
cultivation on privately owned land.43 It was all the more curious 
considering that the objects and reasons stated in the law in question 
suggested an equally, if not greater, concern for preserving valuable 
paintings and artifacts that were also on the premises. Similarly, the 
SCI has been loath to interfere with the operation of Article 31B, 
despite the immense possibility of abuse.44 At the time of its 
introduction, the Ninth Schedule was populated with a short list of 
thirteen land reform laws.45 It has now expanded to a list of over two 
 
39. See Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552 (India). 
40. See Somavanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 S.C.R. (3) 774; see also Sooraram Pratap 
Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552 (India). 
41. See State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji, (1956) SCR 18 (India). 
42. See KT Plantation v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (India). 
43.  Id.  
44. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 (India). 
45. Wahi, supra note 19. 
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hundred laws,46 several of which do not pertain to land reform. While 
the SCI did decide that the laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule could 
not alter the “basic structure”47 of the Indian Constitution,48 it did not 
impose any criteria that must be fulfilled by the law to justify its 
insertion in the Ninth Schedule.49 Moreover, the laws inserted in the 
schedule before 1973, when the basic structure doctrine was 
propounded, cannot be challenged on any grounds.50 The SCI was 
unwilling to “[upset] settled claims and titles” and it was hardly any 
consolation that, in the opinion of the court, laws from that period 
“mostly pertain to laws of agrarian reform.”51 
With Article 31C, once again, it is seen that the SCI has been 
lenient towards the state in its interpretation of the scope of Article 31C. 
For instance, in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India,52 the court was easily 
satisfied that the acquisition of property held in excess of a prescribed 
ceiling limit deserved the protection of Article 31C.53 However, it did 
not consider that the enactment simultaneously empowered the 
government to dispose the land thus acquired “for any purpose relating 
to or connected with industry . . . .”  Except for Justice Talzapurkar, 
none of the judges saw this provision as militating against the very 
purpose, the justice requirement, sought to be protected by Article 
31C.54 
In addition to examining the constitutional validity of land 
acquisition laws, the judiciary is also tasked with examining whether 
executive action taken to acquire land is within the strictures of the 
 
46. INDIA CONST. art 31B. 
47. While the constitutional provision on the powers of the Parliament to amend the Indian 
Constitution does not specify any limits on their amending powers, the SCI in Kesavananda 
Bharati v. State of Kerala laid down that certain basic features of the Indian Constitution cannot 
be altered. AIR 1973 SC 1461. In the past, the SCI has decided that, for instance, secularism, 
democracy, judicial review, and rule of law are part of the basic structure of the Indian 
Constitution. The right to property, however, has never been considered part of the basic 
structure. Hence with respect to the laws inserted in the Ninth Schedule, it is only when it 
violates the “essence” of the right to equality, the right to life or individual liberties that it can 
be struck down. See generally Madhav Khosla, Constitutional Amendment, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 232-250 (Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap 
Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016). 
48. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 (India). 
49.  Id. 
50. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362 (India). 
51.  Id at 397.  
52. (1981) 1 SCC 166 (India). 
53.  Id. 
54. Id. 
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authorizing law. A holistic understanding of the jurisprudence of Indian 
eminent domain, then, requires an examination of the manner in which 
the judiciary interprets these laws, particularly, their definition of 
public purpose. It is not possible here to examine all of these acquisition 
laws; instead, we focus on the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“LAA 
1894”),55 for two main reasons: first, most acquisition of land by the 
Indian state has taken place under this law; and, second, the law is of 
colonial heritage, and arguably carries with it a certain conviction in 
the legitimacy, and breadth, of the power of the state to acquire land. It 
was only recently that the LAA 1894 was replaced by the Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“LARR 2013”).56 The LARR 2013 is 
considered to be somewhat friendly to the interests of landowners, 
when compared to the LAA 1894,57 even though it does not 
significantly alter the balance of powers between the state and 
landowners.58 
The LAA 1894 contains a definition of public purpose and 
requires that before the government acquire land for its own use, it be 
satisfied that the land is required “for a public purpose.”59 Despite this, 
the law barely acted as a restraint on the ability of the government to 
acquire private lands.60 This was because it contained a rather broad 
definition of public purpose, which “included” inter alia planned 
development, town planning, and residential purposes, for carrying out 
health and education schemes, and for a state-owned corporation or 
public office.61 The SCI therefore promptly held that the definition is 
an inclusive one.62 In fact, one could go so far as to argue that the 
statutory definition is not of any relevance, considering the frequent 
 
55.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India). 
56.  The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act, 2013, No. 30, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).  
57. Wahi, supra note 19. 
58. Usha Ramanathan, Land Acquisition, Eminent Domain and the 2011 Bill, (2011) 
46(44–5) ECON. & POL. WKLY., 10–4 (2011); Mihir Desai, Land Acquisition Law and the 
Proposed Challenges, 46(26–27) ECON. & POL. WKLY., 95–100 (2011); Michael Levien, 
Rationalising Dispossession: The Land Acquisition and Resettlement Bills, 46(11) ECONOMIC 
& POLITICAL WEEKLY, 66–71 (2011). 
59.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India), 
§ 3(f).  
60. Sebastian Morris & Ajay Pandey, Towards Reform of Land Acquisition Framework in 
India, 42(22) ECON. & POL. WKLY., 2083–90 (2007). 
61. Section 3(f), Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
62. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 S.C.R. (3) 774. 
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suggestion from the judiciary that public purpose is not static and 
cannot be defined, 63 even when dealing with cases under the LAA 
1894. Furthermore, once again, we see that the judiciary has been loath 
to interfere with the determination of public purpose made by the 
government.64 This is also the result of the statutory presumption, 
under Section 6(3), that a declaration by the government that the land 
is required for a public purpose will be conclusive evidence of the 
same.65 Accordingly, the courts have held that the question of “public 
purpose” is not justiciable and is unwilling to intervene unless the 
executive has acted in colorable exercise of its powers under the 
legislation.66 
Not surprisingly, then, a recent study found that the SCI had 
invalidated the acquisition of land for lacking a public purpose in only 
thirteen of seventy-nine cases, in which this ground was raised, of a 
total of 1,300 cases on land acquisition.67 Thus, we see again that while 
theoretically the state can only acquire private lands to serve a public 
purpose, in practice, the state is not subject to judicial scrutiny on this 
count, and barely held accountable. This perhaps was inevitable 
considering that the law was drafted by a colonial state; yet, the LAA 
1894 continued to operate for more than sixty years after India gained 
independence in 1947 without shifting the balance of power away from 
the state. Apart from the statutory presumption in favor of the 
determination of public purpose made by the government, this point is 
further established by the fact that the LAA 1894 seemingly permitted 
acquisition of land other than for a public purpose.68 Namely, the LAA 
1894 provides that land may be acquired “for a public purpose or for a 
company,”69 and lays down a distinct procedure for each type of 
acquisition.70 While the “public process” procedure became applicable 
when the acquisition was funded either wholly or in part by the state, 
the procedure for the latter became applicable when the acquisition was 
 
63. Daulat Singh Surana v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (2007) 1 SCC 641 (India). 
64. Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 S.C.C. 552. 
65. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, (1963) SCR (3) 774 (India). 
66. Id. 
67. See WAHI, supra note 29. 
68. Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 1 SCC 728 (India). 
69.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India). 
70.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India), 
§ 3(f). 
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entirely funded by the acquiring company.71 Either the LAA 1894 did 
not perceive any contradiction between the muscle of the state being 
employed to compel landowners to part with their property for a private 
entity, and the doctrine of eminent domain; or it was never honestly 
committed to the doctrine. The Punjab High Court, however, did notice 
this contradiction and struck down the procedure for acquisition of land 
for a company as being unconstitutional; suggesting that it had no 
validity following the constitutional embargo on the acquisition of land 
for a private purpose.72 This decision was, though, reversed by the 
SCI.73 
In part, the court relied on the observations in Babu Barkya 
Thakur v. State of Bombay74 that the LAA 1894 mandated that 
acquisition of land for a company, under Part VII, serve some public 
purpose.75 This was drawn from a reading Sections 40 and 41 of the 
LAA 1894, which required that the government execute an agreement 
with the company to employ the land either to provide housing to its 
workmen or for the construction of works that are likely to prove useful 
to the public.76 In any case, the court concluded that the LAA 1894 was 
exempted under Article 31(5) of the Indian Constitution, as “existing 
law,” from the twin requirements for the exercise of eminent domain.77 
Therefore, if anything, the deletion of Article 31 pursuant to the Forty-
Fourth Amendment, should have led to a reassessment of the validity 
of the procedure for acquisition for a company under the LAA 1894. 
The SCI did, though, attempt to partly restore balance when it 
came to the power of the state to acquire land for a company by 
interpreting the requirement under Section 40(b) of the LAA 1894, that 
the “work [be] likely to prove useful to the public,” in a restrictive 
manner.78 It held that the requirement is fulfilled only if the public has 
the right to use the work itself, and not merely the product of it.79 In 
 
71. Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India); Somawanti v. State of 
Punjab, (1963) SCR (3) 774 (India); Pratibha Nema v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC 
3140 (India). 
72. Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India). 
73. Id. 
74. (1961) 1 SCR 128 (India). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India). 
77. Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India). 
78. R.L. Arora v. State of UP, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 149 (India). 
79. Id. 
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this decision of the court, which was celebrated in many quarters,80 the 
court refused to accept that the legislature could have intended that 
individuals “be compelled to part with their lands for private profit of 
others who might be owners of companies, through the Government, 
simply because the company might produce goods which would be 
useful to the public.”81 The legislature quickly responded by amending 
the LAA 1894 to include among the permitted uses for an acquiring 
company, the “construction of some building or work for a company, 
which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry 
or work which is for a public purpose.”82 The SCI however read the 
requirement of public purpose as attaching to the work or building to 
be constructed.83 As a result, it was necessary to establish the public 
purpose that would be served by the specific work or building to be 
constructed by the company on the acquired land; it was not sufficient 
to establish that the company, or the industry in which it operated, was 
in the public interest.84 As such, the judiciary rendered the “company” 
route unattractive because it restricted the manner in which the 
company could utilize the land. 
While this may have been one step forward, the SCI quickly took 
matters back by (more than) two steps with its decision in Somawanti 
v. State of Punjab.85 It reiterated that the determination of public 
purpose by the government is not justiciable, but also it held that even 
a nominal contribution to the acquisition cost by the state would be 
sufficient for it to access the “public purpose” route.86 This meant that 
the state could acquire land for a company with effectively less scrutiny 
under the “public purpose” route, and without the need to impose 
conditions on the manner in which the land must be utilized. In this 
decision, therefore, the SCI upheld an acquisition for setting up a 
factory to manufacture refrigerator compressors, simply deferring to 
the opinion of the government that it was a public utility.87 This 
decision was unfaithful to the presumption underlying the decisions in 
 
80. Colin Gonsalves, Judicial Failure on Land Acquisitions for Companies, 45(32) ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. 37–42 (2010). 
81.  R.L. Arora v. State of UP, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 149 (India).  
82.  Id. 
83. R.L. Arora v. State of UP, (1964) 6 SCR 784 (India). 
84. R.K. Agarwalla v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 995 (India). 
85. (1963) SCR (3) 774 (India). 
86. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 SCR (3) 774 (India). 
87. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 SCR (3) 774 (India). 
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both Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab88 and R.L. Arora v. State of 
Bombay89 that undertaking useful economic activity does not in itself 
amount to public purpose. We see again, therefore, that the permissive 
attitude of the judiciary predates the deletion of the constitutional 
protection against arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Thereafter, the SCI has on several occasions found land 
acquisition for industrial development or for setting up of industrial 
estates and parks as amounting to a public purpose,90 regardless of 
whether the immediate beneficiary is a private entity.91 This has been 
the outcome despite an amendment to the LAA 1894 in 1984 to exclude 
“acquisition of land for a company” from the purview of the definition 
of “public purpose” in Section 3(f).92 In fact, the SCI suggested that 
“facilitating the setting up of an industry in private sector [is] imbued 
with the character of public purpose acquisition if the government 
comes forward to sanction the payment of a nominal sum towards 
compensation.”93 As a result, the state has been described as an “estate 
agent for companies”94 In other words, we see that the expropriation 
rules are relaxed to the extent that the state is able to exercise its powers 
to serve private interests, rather than simply justice costs. 
Recently, this issue was examined afresh in a challenge to the 
acquisition of farmland in West Bengal, under the “public purpose” 
route, for Tata Motors Limited to set-up a factory.95 This particular land 
acquisition had triggered a massive political conflict in the State, which 
eventually forced the project to be relocated to the State of Gujarat.96 
While the two-judge bench of the SCI invalidated the acquisition, both 
judges proffered different reasons. Interestingly, Justice V. Gopal 
Gowda concluded that the land was acquired entirely at the instance of 
the company but “in the guise of an acquisition for public purpose.”97 
Therefore, he invalidated the acquisition for not complying with the 
 
88. (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India). 
89. (1964) 6 SCR 784 (India). 
90. Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, (1966) 3 SCR 885 (India); Narayan Govind 
Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 (India). 
91. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, AIR 1955 SC 41 (India); Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. 
District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552 (India). 
92.  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India), 
§ 3. 
93. Pratibha Nema v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC 3140 (India). 
94. See Gonsalves, supra note 80. 
95. Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal, (2017) 11 SCC 601 (India). 
96.  Id. 
97. Id. 
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requirements under the “company” route. He nonetheless “admitted” 
that the acquisition of land to set up industrial units was 
understandable,98 only that he urged the state to strictly follow 
procedure “where the brunt of this development is borne by the weakest 
sections of the society.”99 
This also points to the rather spurious distinction that has been 
created between the “private” and “public” spheres, for the sake of 
defining public purpose. For instance, where local tradesmen were 
being uprooted from their place of business, at a popular pilgrimage 
site, for the safety and convenience of the devotees,100 the court upheld 
their eviction suggesting that private interest must give way to public 
interest.101 Similarly, in another case, the acquisition of land for setting 
up a dockyard was upheld as being in the public interest, even though 
several workers were losing their jobs as a result.102 The absurdity of 
the judicial construction of the “public” is perhaps most evident in 
cases where the landowners have in turn argued that the land is already 
being used for a similar public purpose. For instance, where land was 
being acquired to set up a fertilizer factory (apparently a public 
purpose), it was argued that the land was already being utilized for 
manufacturing building material.103 The courts, however, had 
previously rejected similar arguments on the ground that it was the 
prerogative of the state to prioritize different public utilities.104 
Further, it appears that the inchoate yet mythical nature of public 
interest has largely permitted the state to conflate the interests of the 
public with that of the elite. For instance, the SCI permitted the 
establishment of a financial district at the cost of small farmers who 
depended on the land for a livelihood.105 Similarly, alongside 
constructing an expressway, farmland was acquired along the proposed 
route for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and 
residential purposes.106 In a similar vein, the judiciary has also 
 
98. Id. 
99.  Id. 
100. Sayyed Ratanbhai Sayeed v. Shirdi Nagar Panchayaat, (2016) 4 SCC 631 (India). 
101.  Id. 
102. Scindia Employees Union v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1 SCC 85 (India). 
103. Abdul Husein Tayabali v. State of Gujarat, (1968) 1 SCR 597 (India). 
104. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 (India). 
105. Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 S.C.C. 552. 
106.  Id. 
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permitted the acquisition of land for constructing tourist complexes,107 
and even a hotel-cum-golf resort.108 
While of course the LAA 1894 is now replaced by the LARR 
2013, it does not significantly alter the power structure put in place by 
the former. In other words, while the LARR 2013 is a step forward, in 
that it requires enhanced compensation and efforts at rehabilitating the 
landowners, it does little to alter the current discourse on “public 
purpose.” Firstly, it again permits the government to acquire land for a 
private company, and without any of the restrictions from the LAA 
1894 on the manner in which the land may be utilized. Secondly, it 
defines “public purpose” in broad terms to include, for instance, 
infrastructure projects, industrial corridors, mining activities, and 
tourism projects, which leaves little scope for the judiciary to import 
the “public use” test that was employed by the SCI in R.L. Arora v. 
State of Uttar Pradesh.109 It is likely therefore to continue to “permit 
the transfer of resources to the private sector,” except with “some 
solace for the displaced.”110 
One significant gain found in LARR 2013, though, is the 
requirement of prior consent of eighty percent of affected families to 
proceed with the land acquisition.111 The process of acquisition for a 
company therefore at least bears some resemblance now to an ordinary 
market transaction insomuch as it depends on consent, although not of 
all those affected. Still, worryingly, there have already been some 
efforts by the present government to dilute this requirement. 
What we are left with, then, is a position whereby acquisitions of 
property in India are at least ostensibly treated as though necessary for 
meeting the justice requirements/costs of the state. Whether such needs 
are truly being met, however, is another matter. Instead, through 
judicial interpretation, while private property may readily be acquired 
by the state for what is treated as a public purpose, the actual benefit to 
the community in terms of justice needs may be slight, with a 
corresponding diminution of the protection provided for private 
 
107. State of Haryana v. Eros City Developers Private Limited; Sooraram Pratap Reddy 
v. District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552. 
108. Royal Orchid Hotels v. G. Jayaram Reddy, (2011) 10 S.C.C. 608. 
109. 1962 Supp (2) S.C.R. 149. 
110. Mihir Desai, Land Acquisition Law and the Proposed Challenges, 46(26–27) ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. 95, 95–100 (2011). 
111. Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 
(India), § 2(2)(b)(i). 
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property. We will see a similar outcome in Australia, both of which can 
be contrasted as with the strong protection of private property in the 
United States. 
III. AUSTRALIA: SECTION 51(XXXI) 
As is the case with India, and as we will see when we turn to the 
United States, the place of property, and especially of land, is deeply 
ingrained in the Australian psyche. Whereas the depth of feeling about 
property in India is found in judicial interpretation and is exemplified 
in the United States in the factual story of Mrs. Kelo’s Little Pink 
House in Kelo v. City of New London,112 the Australian sentiment can 
be traced to a fictional account found in The Castle, a comedy film 
which follows the battle of Daryl Kerrigan in the High Court of 
Australia (the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States) to 
prevent his house from being compulsorily acquired for use as an 
airport.113 Before the High Court, Kerrigan summarizes the successful 
argument against acquisition:  
I’m really starting to understand how the Aborigines feel . . . . This 
house is like their land. It holds their memories. The land is their 
story. It’s everything. You can’t just pick it up and plonk it down 
somewhere else. This country’s gotta stop stealing other people’s 
land.114  
Sometimes fact imitates fiction: The Federal Court decision in French 
v. Gray,115 for instance, involved a challenge to an attempt by the 
Australian Commonwealth (federal) government compulsorily to 
acquire Graham French’s farm in South Australia for military 
purposes.116 A real-life Daryl Kerrigan, French won the case, but 
“lamented the time and money lost in the long process,” concluding 
that the government “shouldn’t be able to rip people’s lands off them 
for no good reason . . . it’s just wrong.”117 
 
112.  545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
113. THE CASTLE (Village Roadshow 1997). 
114. Dave Crewe, The Castle: Cheat Sheet, S.B.S. AUSTRALIA (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.sbs.com.au/movies/article/2017/04/10/castle-cheat-sheet [https://perma.cc/P4RT-
HRGA]. 
115. French v Gray [2013] F.C.A. 263 (27 March 2013) (Austl.). 
116.  Id.  
117. Tory Shepherd, Their home is their castle - Corunna Station will stay in the hands of 
the French family after Federal Court victory, ADELAIDE NOW (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/their-home-is-their-castle-corunna-
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Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution provides a means 
for the Commonwealth to acquire private property to meet justice costs 
as well as a protection for private property interests such as those 
claimed by the fictional Daryl Kerrigan and the factual Graham 
French.118 The provision reads: 
51 Legislative powers of the Parliament . . . 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to: 
 . . . 
(xxxi) the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or 
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has 
power to make laws;119 
The heading and opening clause of Section 51 are important, for 
two reasons. First, in its terms, the Australian Constitution applies only 
to the Commonwealth, or federal government, and not to the States or 
Territories120 which comprise the Australian federation. While the 
States are subject to their own legislatively imposed limitations upon 
the power compulsorily to acquire property,121 we are concerned here 
only with comparing the constitutions of the United States, India, and 
Australia. Unlike India, where legislation plays a significant role in 
 
station-will-stay-in-the-hands-of-the-french-family-after-federal-court-victory/story-fni6uo1m-
1226756092281 [https://perma.cc/XKE6-2ZJX]. 
118. See generally Simon Evans, When is an acquisition of property not an acquisition of 
property?: The search for a principled approach to section 51(xxxi), 11 PUBLIC L REV. 183 
(2000). 
119.  Australia Constitution s 51. 
120. The Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory are territories of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, with the relationship between the Commonwealth and a Territory 
governed by the Constitution of Australia, s 122. The Commonwealth has exercised its power 
to establish self-government in both Territories by enacting the Northern Territory (Self-
Government) Act 1978 (Cth) (Austl.) and the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) 
Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl.), respectively. 
121. See, e.g., Desane Properties Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2018] NSW 553 (1 
May 2018) (interpreting the relevant New South Wales legislation, the Land Acquisition (Just 
Terms) Compensation Act 1991 (NSW)). For representative examples of the Commonwealth, 
Territory, and State legislation, see Land Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth); Lands Acquisition Act 
(NT); Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic); Michael Crommelin, Land Title, 
Acquisition and Management in Australia [2011] U. OF MELBOURNE LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER 
NO. 587, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060700 
[https://perma.cc/3GLV-H8AX]; GARY NEWTON & CHRISTOPHER CONOLLY, LAND 
ACQUISITION (7th ed. 2017); MARCUS JACOBS, LAW OF COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION (2d 
ed. 2015). 
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determining when compulsory acquisition of land is justified, in 
Australia, legislation enacted by the Commonwealth—the Land 
Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth)—merely establishes the process, and not 
the justifiability of such acquisitions. The Commonwealth legislation 
itself is subject to the terms of Section 51(xxxi), which establishes the 
standard for testing the justifiability of compulsory acquisition of land. 
And, second, because, taken together—and unlike the Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, which is framed only as a 
limitation on power122—the heading and opening clause of Section 51 
make clear that Sub-Section xxxi effects both a grant of power and a 
limitation upon it. 
There is little available evidence which reveals what precisely the 
framers had in mind when they included Section 51(xxxi) in the 
Constitution. Sir John Quick (one of the framers of the Australian 
Constitution) and Sir Robert Garran (the secretary of the framers 
drafting committee)—who published an annotated edition of the 
Australian Constitution contemporaneously with its promulgation in 
1901 which remains the authoritative account of the conventions and 
debates which ultimately produced the Australian Constitution123—
provide little historical background.124 Few authors since have shed 
any light on these origins, although in JT International SA v. 
Commonwealth, Justice (now Chief Justice) Kiefel  supports the view 
that while “[t]here appears to have been little discussion of this 
provision in the Convention Debates[,] . . . [i]t was drafted to meet the 
concern that there might have been some uncertainty as to whether the 
Commonwealth had legislative power to acquire property.”125 
Quick and Garran provide historical support for Justice Kiefel’s 
view, focusing their attention on the fact that the Australian and 
American constitutional provisions are not the same; rather, the words 
“the acquisition of property” “expressly confer[] on the 
 
122. See generally GEORGE WILLIAMS, SEAN BRENNAN AND ANDREW LYNCH, 
BLACKSHIELD AND WILLIAMS AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY: 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2018). 
123. See generally SIR JOHN QUICK AND SIR ROBERT GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH (1955). 
124. Indeed, it is likely the case that Quick and Garran provide little by way of historical 
background because there simply is no extant contemporaneous account of the debates which 
produced Section 51(xxxi). See Simon Evans, Property and the Drafting of the Australian 
Constitution, 29(2) FED. L. REV. 121 (2001). But see R. L. Hamilton, Some Aspects of the 
Acquisition Power of the Commonwealth, 5 FED. L. REV. 265 (1973). 
125. J.T. International SA v Commonwealth [2012] 250 CLR 1, 112–13 (Austl.). 
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Commonwealth, through the Federal Parliament, the right—technically 
called the right of ‘eminent domain’—to compulsorily take property, 
both private and provincial, for Federal purposes.” This, Quick and 
Garran argue, is the functional equivalent not of the US Fifth 
Amendment, but of the Necessary and Proper Clause contained in 
Article I which, they note, vests in the federal government the right of 
eminent domain, which “may be exercised within the States, when 
necessary, for the enjoyment and exercise of the powers conferred upon 
the Government by the Constitution.”126 And while the Australian 
Constitution contains a “ways and means” power in Section 51(xxxix), 
it was not considered advisable by the drafters to use it to allow the 
right of eminent domain to be exercised upon any implied or incidental 
power.127 The operation of Section 51(xxxi) therefore hinges upon the 
question of sovereignty: 
Although the American courts [as of 1901] have given . . . 
decisions [concerning the necessary and proper clause and the 
takings power] it must be remembered that they were given under 
the Constitution of a sovereign State. The Commonwealth is not a 
sovereign State, but a federated community possessing many 
political powers approaching, and elements resembling, 
sovereignty, but falling short of it. Its Parliament can only exercise 
delegated powers carved out for it, and assigned to it, by the 
sovereign Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland. No implied 
power will be founded on any conception of latent unexpressed 
sovereignty, as in the case of the Government of the United States. 
Hence all possible doubt as to the right of the Commonwealth to 
acquire property for federal purposes has been removed by this 
sub-section [s 51(xxxi)], which renders it unnecessary to resort to 
the “ways and means” sub-sec. xxxix.128 
On its terms, then, Section 51(xxxi) comprises both an express 
grant of Commonwealth legislative power to acquire property and a 
limitation upon that power. The leading High Court treatment of the 
provision, Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth confirms this 
textual understanding.129 Having started from the textual understanding 
 
126.  QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 640-41. 
127. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 640-41; see also Rosalind Dixon, 
Overriding Guarantee of Just Terms of Supplementary Source of Power? Rethinking s 51 of the 
Constitution, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 638 (2005). 
128. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 641. 
129. Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth [1948] 76 CLR 1, 349, aff’d JT 
International SA v Commonwealth [2012] 250 CLR 1, 113 [313] (Austl.). 
2019] BALANCING JUSTICE NEEDS 1023 
of a grant of power and a limitation, the High Court has, through 
interpretation and application, defined the scope of operation of both 
components. 
In order to set the parameters of the grant of power compulsorily 
to take property, the High Court focusses on the meaning of 
“acquisition” and of “property.” In relation to the former, the Court 
applies a “deprivation-corresponding benefit test,” which requires not 
only that a party—either a person, a State, or a Territory130 (although 
not a private third party131)—must lose property rights—but also that 
another party—which may or may not be the Commonwealth, provided 
that such party, including a State or a Territory,132 is acting pursuant to 
an exercise of Commonwealth legislative power—must acquire a 
corresponding benefit.133 As such, the mere deprivation of property134 
or the adjustment of an entitlement to a resource pursuant to a license135 
is insufficient to constitute an acquisition for the purposes of this 
power, although the egregiousness of the loss may sometimes influence 
the courts as to whether such a loss and corresponding benefit is 
found.136 
But in applying the deprivation-corresponding benefit test, the 
High Court has made clear that a “regulatory taking” fails to constitute 
an acquisition.137 Cunningham v. The Commonwealth, involved a 
challenge brought by several former members of the Commonwealth 
Parliament against legislation which altered retirement allowances and 
 
130. See generally State of South Australia v Honourable Peter Slipper M.P. (‘Nuclear 
Waste Dump Case’) [2004] 136 FCR 164 (Austl.); see also generally A.J. Brown, When Does 
Property Become Territory? Nuclear Waste, Federal Land Acquisition and Constitutional 
Requirements for State Consent, 28 ADELAIDE L. REV. 113 (2007); see generally Dennis Rose, 
The 10-Point Plan – Its Constitutional Validity, 17(3) AUST. MINING & PETROLEUM L. J. 216 
(1998). 
131. See generally Tom Allen, The Acquisition of Property on Just Terms, 22 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 351 (2000). 
132. See Sean Brennan, Section 51(xxxi) and the Acquisition of Property under 
Commonwealth-State Arrangements: The Relevance to Native Title Extinguishment on Just 
Terms, 15(2) AUST. INDIGENOUS L. REV. 74 (2011). 
133. See Duane Ostler, Gain as loss: The High Court’s approach in regulatory acquisition 
cases 26(1) BOND L. REV. 66 (2014); Duane Ostler, The Drafting of the Australian 
Commonwealth Acquisition Clause 28(2) U. OF TASMANIA L. REV. 211 (2009); Duane Ostler, 
A Case of Non-Identical Twins – Comparing the Evolution of Acquisition Law in Australia and 
the United States, 10(1) CANBERRA L. REV. 66 (2011). 
134. P.J. Magennis Pty. Ltd v Commonwealth [1949] 80 CLR 382 (Austl.). 
135. I.C.M. Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] 240 CLR 140 (Austl.). 
136. See generally Ostler, supra note 133. 
137. See generally Pamela O’Connor, The Changing Paradigm of Property and the 
Framing of Regulation as a “Taking,” 36(2) MONASH U. L. REV. 50 (2010). 
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travel benefits, arguing that because such rights constituted property, 
any variation fell within the prohibition of Section 51(xxxi).138 The 
High Court held these benefits to be statutorily created property 
interests “inherently subject to variation” or “inherently defeasible”—
by which was meant that such rights were susceptible to later 
modification or extinguishment without compensation—and therefore 
not capable of animating the protection of Section 51(xxxi).139 
So as to establish the scope of what might be acquired by the 
Commonwealth, the High Court has developed a broad definition of 
“property.”140 Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel establishes that 
“‘property’ in s 51(xxxi) is a general term which refers to any tangible 
or intangible thing which the law protects under the name of property. 
The acquisition of the possession of land is an instance of the 
acquisition of property.”141 And recent judicial authority suggests that 
this definition of property may include a “spiritual connection” to land 
as part of native title held by Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.142 
Having set the parameters of the power to acquire, the High Court 
has focused on the words “on just terms” and “purpose in respect of 
which” to set the limits to Commonwealth legislative activity taken in 
furtherance of it. Purely as a matter of textual analysis, these two sets 
 
138.  Cunningham v The Commonwealth [2016] 259 CLR 536 (Austl.).  
139. Cunningham v The Commonwealth [2016] 259 CLR 536 (Austl.). The High Court 
applies the same approach to statutorily created mining and water licenses. Newcrest Mining 
(WA) Ltd v Commonwealth [1997] 190 CLR 513 (Austl.); Commonwealth . WMC Resources 
Ltd [1998] 194 CLR 1 (Austl.); Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Limited v 
Commonwealth [2012] 246 CLR 561 (Austl.); see also Margaret Brock, When is property 
inherently defeasible for the purposes of s 51(xxxi)?, 21(2) AUST. PROP. L. J. 180 (2012); Gavan 
Griffith & Geoffrey Kennett, Constitutional Protection Against Uncompensated Expropriations 
of Property, in AUSTRALIAN MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 49 
(1998); D.F. Jackson & Stephen Lloyd, Compulsory Acquisition of Property, in AUSTRALIAN 
MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 75 [1998]. 
140. See generally Pamela O’Connor, The Changing Paradigm of Property and the 
Framing of Regulation as a “Taking,” 36(2) MONASH U. L. REV. 50 (2010). 
141. Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel [1944] 68 C.L.R. 261, 295 (Austl.). 
142. See Northern Territory v Griffiths [2019] HCA 7 (Austl.); see also  Griffiths v 
Minister for Lands, Planning and Environment [2008] 235 CLR 232, 253-57 (Austl.); 
Queensland v Congoo [2015] 256 CLR 239 (Austl.); D.F. Jackson & Stephen Lloyd, 
Compulsory Acquisition of Property, in AUSTRALIAN MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW 
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 75 (1998); Robert French & Patricia Lane, The common law of native 
title in Australia, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL SCHOLARSHIP 10 (2002); Sean Brennan, Native Title 
and the Acquisition of Property under the Australian Constitution, 28 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 
28 (2004); Wing Hsieh, Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution and the Compulsory 
Acquisition of Native Title, 32 ADELAIDE L. REV. 287 (2011); Brennan, supra note 132. 
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of words, read together, might be assumed to establish an individual 
right to private property. The Privy Council143 (while that body 
remained the final court of appeal for Australia) seemed to adopt an 
individual right view, and Quick and Garran wrote: 
It was declared that private property should not be taken for public 
use without just compensation. This is regarded not as a grant but 
a restriction on the implied power. So the power of the Federal 
Parliament to take property . . . is limited by the condition that it 
must be exercised “on just terms.” This condition is consistent 
with the common law of England and with the general law of 
European nations. It is intended to recognize the principle of the 
immunity of . . . property from interference by the Federal 
authority, except on fair and equitable terms, and this principle is 
thus constitutionally established and placed beyond legislative 
control.144 
And “purpose in respect of which” establish “[t]he second limit to 
the power of the Commonwealth to acquire . . . property . . . , that it 
must only take if for purposes in respect of which the Parliament has 
power to make laws.”145 By this, Quick and Garran meant those powers 
expressly conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament by Section 
51, implying that these words are something in the nature of an 
individual right to private property. The High Court of Australia, 
however, consistently suggests that both sets of words comprise a limit 
on Commonwealth legislative power and not the creation or protection 
of an individual right to private property.146 
Notwithstanding the High Court’s approach, though, in its 
invocation, Section 51(xxxi) appears to protect an individual right to 
private property. In fact, the High Court itself seems to view the 
relationship between the power conferred and the limitation imposed 
as balancing community and individual interests.147 Justice Kiefel, for 
instance, wrote in JT International SA v. Commonwealth that “ . . . s 
 
143. See James v Commonwealth [1936] 55 CLR 1, 43–44 (Austl.). 
144. QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 641. 
145. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 642. 
146. See N. K. F. O’Neill, Constitutional Human Rights in Australia, 17(2) FED. L. REV. 
85 (1987); Matthew Stubbs, The Eminent Domain in Australia: The ‘Individual Rights’ 
Approach to s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution (2001) (PhD Thesis, The University of 
Adelaide); Paulina Fishman, Section 51(xxxi): A constitutional guarantee to disappoint property 
owners, 6 PROP. L. REV. 27 (2016). 
147. See Tom Allen, The Acquisition of Property on Just Terms, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 351 
(2000). 
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51(xxxi) . . . serve[s] a dual purpose: to provide the Commonwealth 
with that power and to provide the individual or the State affected with 
protection against governmental interferences with their proprietary 
rights without proper recompense.”148 As such, the words “on just 
terms” tend to be treated as an individual guarantee of private property, 
while the words “purpose in respect of which” as the action which 
triggers or enlivens the operation of that guarantee. 
In Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth, the Court considered 
the nature of the just terms guarantee, holding that the arrangements for 
acquisition of property must either be “fair” or at least such that a 
legislature could reasonably consider the arrangements as being “fair.” 
Fairness in this context must account for the interests of all parties 
affected by the acquisition, as opposed only to the interests of the 
holder of the property so acquired,149 and compensation can take non-
monetary forms,150 although it need not be restricted to the value of the 
property acquired at the date it was taken.151 
At a minimum, the action which triggers or enlivens the just terms 
guarantee includes any of the legislative powers which the 
Commonwealth Parliament possesses pursuant to Section 51.152 In 
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth, Mason CJ wrote that 
the relevant words “confine the exercise of the power to an 
implementation of a purpose within the field of Commonwealth 
legislative power. They are not to be read as an exclusive and 
exhaustive statement of the Parliament’s powers to deal with or provide 
for the involuntary disposition of or transfer of title to an interest in 
property.”153 As such, the just terms guarantee must be read into other 
legislative powers which, by their exercise, purport to acquire 
property.154 
 
148. J.T. International SA v Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1, 112-3 [313] (Kiefel J.) 
(Austl.). 
149. Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1947] 75 CLR 495 (Austl.). 
150. Wurridjal v Commonwealth [2009] 237 CLR 309 (Austl.); see also Celia Winnett, 
Just Terms or Just Money? Section 51(xxxi), Native Title and Non-Monetary Terms of 
Acquisition, 33 U. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 776 (2010). 
151. Grace Bros Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1946] 72 CLR 269 (Austl.). 
152. Johnston Fear & Kingham & The Offset Printing Company Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 
[1943] 67 CLR 314, 318 (Austl.); see also Trade Practices Commission (Cth) v Tooth & Co Ltd 
[1979] 142 CLR 397, 403 (Austl.). 
153. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] 179 CLR 155, 169 (Austl.). 
154. Id. at 169. 
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It is necessary, then, to determine whether the exercise of 
Commonwealth power triggers or enlivens the just terms guarantee. 
Some powers exclude the guarantee because “[a]lthough s. 51(xxxi) 
abstracts the power of acquisition from other legislative powers in s. 
51, it cannot be interpreted so broadly as to render meaningless the 
legitimate use and operation of other powers conferred by s. 51.”155 
Two types of such exclusion exist. First, some powers found in Section 
51, by their express terms, do not require compliance with the 
guarantee; the acquisition of state railways and bankruptcy being the 
axiomatic examples.156 Second, the grant of another legislative power 
found in Section 51 may imply, by its terms, incongruity or 
inconsistency with the just terms guarantee;157 while taxation158 and 
criminal and civil penalties and exactions represent the paradigmatic 
cases,159 many other instances exist, including war-time requisitions,160 
acquisition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional lands,161 
and the imposition of a pecuniary penalty by way of civil proceedings 
and the acquisition by the Controller of Enemy Property of the property 
of subjects of a former enemy to be applied to reparations payable by 
an enemy State.162 
Provided that the power so exercised does not fall within one of 
the categories which excludes the operation of just terms, it is necessary 
to determine that it is, in fact, an exercise of power which triggers or 
enlivens the guarantee. This presents more difficulty than one might 
expect. Again, the High Court proceeds by considering those laws 
which fail to enliven the guarantee. In Clunies-Ross v. Commonwealth, 
the High Court declined to decide whether Section 51(xxxi) was 
“confined to the making of laws with respect to acquisition of property 
for some purpose related to a need for or proposed use or application 
 
155. Id. at 219. 
156. Id. at 170. 
157. See R v Smithers, Ex parte McMillan [1982] 152 CLR 477, 487 (Austl.); Re Director 
of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler [1994] 179 CLR 270, 285 (Austl.); Theophanous v. 
Commonwealth [2006] 225 CLR 101 (Austl.). 
158. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155, 170–71 
(Austl.). 
159. R v Smithers, Ex parte McMillan [1982] 152 CLR 477, 487 (Austl.); see also Re 
Director of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler (1994) 179 CLR 270, 278–81 (Brennan J.), 
285 (Deane and Gaudron JJ.), 295 (McHugh J.). 
160. See, e.g., Andrews v. Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255; Minister of State for the Army v. 
Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261. 
161. See, e.g., Commonwealth v New South Wales (1923) 33 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
162. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] 179 CLR 155, 187-88 (Austl.). 
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of the property to be acquired . . . .”163 Still, three approaches may be 
discerned. The first, in ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth164 
and Spencer v. Commonwealth,165 seeks to characterize a law so as to 
determine whether it does or does not fall within a power triggering the 
guarantee.166 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth167 
represents a second approach; there, Justices Deane and Gaudron, 
while suggesting that a precise test could not be applied so as to 
determine whether a law falls within the scope of Section 51(xxxi), it 
was possible to identify several laws that would not bear the character 
of a law with respect to the acquisition of property: 
One such category consists of laws which provide for the creation, 
modification, extinguishment or transfer of rights and liabilities as 
an incident of, or a means for enforcing, some general regulation 
of the conduct, rights and obligations of citizens in relationships 
or areas which need to be regulated in the common interest. 
Another category consists of laws defining and altering rights and 
liabilities under a government scheme involving the expenditure 
of government funds to provide social security benefits or for other 
public purposes.168 
This “categorisation” approach means that while some laws may 
have the acquisition of property as an incidental consequence, that 
acquisition is not sufficient to impart upon the law the character of a 
law with respect to Section 51(xxxi), thus enlivening the just terms 
guarantee. 
A third approach, not yet adopted by a plurality of the High Court, 
involves the requirement that the Commonwealth power be exercised 
for a public purpose. Griffiths v. Minister for Lands involved an 
exercise of power pursuant to the Crown Lands Act (NT)169 which, it 
was argued, enlivened the operation of Section 43 of the Lands 
Acquisition Act (NT), permitting the Minister to acquire land “for any 
purpose whatsoever” (language very similar to Section 51(xxxi) but 
applicable to the Northern Territory170). The appellants argued that 
 
163. Clunies-Ross v Commonwealth [1984] 155 CLR 193, 200 (Austl.). 
164. ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2009] 240 CLR 140 (Austl.). 
165. Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] 241 CLR 118 (Austl.). 
166. See generally Stephen Lloyd, Compulsory Acquisition and Informal Agreements: 
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 137 (2011). 
167. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] 179 CLR 155 (Austl.). 
168. Id. at 189-90.  
169.  NT is the abbreviation for Northern Territory.   
170. For more on the territories, see supra note 120. 
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notwithstanding the use of “for any purpose whatsoever,” the Minister 
was not empowered to acquire land from one person solely to enable it 
to be sold or leased by the Northern Territory for the private use of 
another person.171 While the majority resolved the issue in favour of 
the Northern Territory as a matter of statutory interpretation in 
accordance with Section 51(xxxi) jurisprudence,172 Justice Kirby, in 
dissent, wrote that “[t]he public purpose of all compulsory acquisitions 
under federal or Territory law has a constitutional origin.”173 Justice 
Kirby concluded that a compulsory acquisition for private purposes 
may therefore fall outside the public purposes requirement implicit in 
Section 51(xxxi).174 While writing in a dissent not then or since adopted 
by a majority of the High Court, Justice Kirby claims to be 
summarizing both the implication of Section 51(xxxi), and the relevant 
jurisprudence of the High Court as to those instances which will enliven 
the just terms guarantee. As such, a “public purpose” requirement for a 
compulsory acquisition may represent a third approach to the operation 
of the just terms guarantee. 
Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution is both a grant of 
power so as to allow the Commonwealth to meet its justice needs/costs, 
and a limitation upon that grant so as to provide at least some minimal 
level of protection for private property which may be so acquired. It is 
rare, though, for the Commonwealth to rely solely upon that grant so 
as to effect a compulsory acquisition; rather, the Commonwealth 
typically relies upon some other power found in Section 51. A 
compulsory acquisition having occurred, the courts, in an effort to 
balance the interests of the community with those of the individual, 
consider the purpose (pursuant to a relevant head of Commonwealth 
legislative power) in respect of which the property is acquired so as to 
determine whether the just terms guarantee (which provides, at least 
impliedly, an individual right to private property) has been enlivened. 
And given the fact that the power relied upon by the Commonwealth 
for such acquisition is seldom that found in Section 51(xxxi), but much 
more frequently a power that is for one reason or another excluded from 
the operation of the just terms guarantee, it is equally unusual for the 
High Court to find that the guarantee is enlivened. Thus, as occurs in 
 
171. Griffiths v Minister for Lands, Planning and Environment [2008] 235 CLR 232, ¶ 19 
(Austl.). 
172. Id. at ¶ 30. 
173. Id. at ¶ 84. 
174. Id. at ¶ 86. 
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India, whether such acquisition is truly for the purpose of meeting the 
justice requirements/costs of the Commonwealth, it is treated as such, 
at least ostensibly, by the High Court. 
IV. UNITED STATES: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Any discussion of compulsory acquisition of property in the 
United States must begin with the relevant clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution: “No person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”175 These 
two clauses are commonly referred to, respectively, as the Due Process 
Clause and the Takings Clause. Although often treated separately, the 
two clauses are obviously closely related and are not always rigorously 
distinguished from one another.176 The Due Process Clause forbids the 
government from depriving any person of property “without due 
process of law”; or, stated positively, allows government infringement 
of property rights only if consistent with the requirements of due 
process. The Takings Clause forbids the government from taking 
private property for public use without just compensation; or, stated 
positively, allows compulsory acquisition of private property but only 
for “public use” and with “just compensation.” 
Almost all state constitutions contain provisions similar to the 
Takings Clause.177 At one time, these state constitutional protections 
were more significant because the Fifth Amendment in the federal Bill 
of Rights was long held to apply only to actions of the federal 
 
175. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
176. One scholar, who seemingly reviewed all the prior due process cases, reported that 
the US Supreme Court did not always limit the word “taking” to cases arising under the Takings 
Clause and “deprivation” to cases under the Due Process Clause. See FRANK R. STRONG, 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 202 n. 414 
(1986). 
177. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“Private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation.”). North Carolina is today the last state without a Takings Clause in 
its constitution. See PHILIP NICHOLS, 1 THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.8 (Julius L. Sackman 
& Russell D. Van Brunt eds., 3d ed. 2000). Notwithstanding the absence of a Takings Clause, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that compulsory acquisition without compensation 
is unconstitutional as a violation of “natural equity.” See Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550 
(1874). Today, the source of the restraint is located in the clause guaranteeing the protections of 
the “law of the land.” N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall . . . be in any manner deprived 
of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”). See Finch v. Durham, 384 S.E.2d 8 
(N.C. 1989). 
2019] BALANCING JUSTICE NEEDS 1031 
government.178 Then in 1897 in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy 
Railroad Co. v. Chicago179 the US Supreme Court ruled that 
compensation for private property taken for public use was a 
requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
adopted in 1868, which applies to actions by the states.180 Today the 
case is commonly described as “incorporating” the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, and is viewed 
as the first in a series of cases that over the next half century applied 
most of the guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although state constitutional provisions are today largely 
overshadowed by the federal clauses, much of the basic law of eminent 
domain was originally made by state courts. From early in American 
history, states had delegated the sovereign power of eminent domain to 
private companies engaged in providing useful improvements, such as 
canals. But it was with the advent of the railroad that delegation of the 
state’s power of compulsory acquisition became widespread.181 At 
first, the delegation was in private acts of incorporation of individual 
railroads.182 Later, general railroad laws granted all carriers the power 
of eminent domain,183 greatly accelerating the development of the law 
upon the subject. As the leading legal historian of American railroads 
has written: “Railroads provided much of the impetus for judges to 
fashion takings jurisprudence.”184 In the rush to secure the benefits of 
the new means of transportation, the exact nature of the interest taken—
 
178. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (“We are of opinion, that the 
provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be 
taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise 
of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the 
states.”). 
179. 166 U.S. 266 (1897). 
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.”). 
181. The companies usually tried to acquire the needed property by voluntary sale, but 
bargaining was always in the shadow of compulsory acquisition. 
182. See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, N.C. 
Priv. L., ch. 78, arts. 14, 18 (1833). 
183. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Railroad Companies, no. 82, 
Laws of Michigan, 1855. 
184. JAMES W. ELY, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 189 (2001). 
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easement or fee simple185—was sometimes uncertain, a problem that 
continues to cloud property titles to this day.186 
The prime motivation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the analogous state constitutional provisions was the 
protection of private property, viewed as “the guardian of every other 
right”187 and as a contributing cause of prosperity.188 The constitutions 
guaranteed “just compensation,” generally the fair market value of 
what was taken, the amount to be determined by a court, often aided by 
a jury, not by the legislature.189 Much of the basic law concerning just 
compensation was laid down by state courts during the Railroad Era.190 
Where the rail line bisected a larger parcel, additional compensation 
for severance damages might be claimed.191 Whether and to what 
extent to allow the railroads credit for benefits conferred by access to 
an improved means of transportation proved particularly challenging. 
At first, railroads often received offsets for benefits to the general 
service area, but over the course of the nineteenth century the rule 
emerged that only special benefits to the affected landowner could be 
considered in the calculation.192 The complex economics involved in 
valuing what was taken continue to raise challenging questions to this 
day. 
By far the most momentous development of takings jurisprudence 
concerned the public use requirement. As noted above, the Fifth 
Amendment does not refer to compulsory acquisition for a “public 
purpose,” but rather to compulsory acquisition for a “public use.” It 
was early determined that public use is not synonymous with public 
 
185. Id. at 197–98. To complicate matters further, it is possible that only a determinable 
interest, “so long as used for railroad purposes,” whether of easement or fee, was taken. Id. 
186. Compare King Assocs. L.L.P. v. Bechtler Development Co., 632 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 
2006) (finding that deed conveyed a fee simple) with Brown v. Penn Cent’l Corp., 510 N.E.2d 
641 (Ind. 1987) (finding that deed created an easement). 
187. ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF 
GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775); see also Murr v. 
Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (“Property rights are necessary to preserve freedom, 
for property ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world 
where governments are always eager to do so for them.”). 
188. See generally James Ely, “That Due Satisfaction Be Made:” The Fifth Amendment 
and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992). 
189. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (holding that the 
condemnee is entitled to be placed “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not 
been taken.”). 
190.  See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
191.  See generally id. 
192. ELY, supra note 184, at 193. 
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ownership. Use by the public, as shippers or passengers, was held to be 
adequate.193 As Thomas Cooley, the leading constitutional scholar of 
the day, recognized, the judicial response to the railroad cases led to a 
general weakening of restraints upon the exercise of eminent 
domain.194 Over time, the use-by-the-public test proved difficult to 
administer: How many people had to have access to the property that 
was taken? And at what price? In addition, the changing role of 
government in economic development made the test increasingly 
impractical. In consequence, the requirement of public use was 
replaced in judicial interpretation by the more relaxed requirement of 
public purpose. What that meant was addressed in Berman v. Parker,195 
decided in 1954, in which the US Supreme Court held that the 
requirement was satisfied by any government purpose permitted by the 
police power, the general authorization to act on behalf of public health, 
safety, and welfare.196 It may be said today that it is the purpose of the 
taking, not the use of what was taken that is important. 
The most difficult question concerning “public purpose” was 
whether it would be satisfied if a government took private property and 
transferred it to another private party. “Taking the property of A and 
giving it to B” had long been the paradigm case of a violation of due 
process.197 But in 2005, in Kelo v. City of New London,198 a sharply 
divided US Supreme Court upheld such a taking as part of a 
comprehensive redevelopment plan.199 The case arose in the fraught 
context of depriving sympathetic homeowners of their property for the 
purpose of turning it over to a corporation that promised to bring jobs 
and benefits to the community.200 Although the majority of justices 
approved the taking, they were careful to point out that they were 
deciding only the minimum requirements of the Fifth Amendment and 
that the states were free to impose stricter standards.201 
Although the Court’s decision in Kelo was consistent with 
precedent and respectful of state and local decision making, it was 
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greeted with widespread criticism. Many states promptly accepted the 
Court’s invitation by adopting statutes and even constitutional 
amendments to limit compulsory acquisition.202 Defenders of property 
rights continue to protest the decision to this day, producing a popular 
book about one of the properties condemned, The Little Pink House, in 
2009,203 followed in 2018 by a feature-length film of the same name.204 
While the taking in Kelo followed the usual procedure of an action 
brought by the condemning authority against named property owners, 
it sometimes happens that property owners themselves commence an 
action, claiming that the government has already taken their property 
or an interest in it. Because of the reversal of the usual parties, this is 
commonly referred to as “inverse condemnation.”205 In United States 
v. Causby,206 a leading case from 1946 concerning air rights, property 
owners prevailed in an action to recover damages from the United 
States for the value of an easement taken by the military’s regular low-
altitude flights over their property.207 
Although Causby involved the taking of an easement, a familiar 
property right, inverse condemnation has also been successfully 
invoked in a case brought by Native Americans claiming a taking of 
their ancestors’ right to pass property by devise or inheritance.208 
Because state courts sometimes reject claims of inverse condemnation 
by holding that the property right in question never existed or was 
previously extinguished,209 the suggestion has been made that there 
may be such a thing as a “judicial taking.”210 
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While inverse condemnation describes cases of actual taking, it is 
also possible for government action to reduce the market value of 
private property by regulations restricting use. Although commonly 
referred to as “regulatory takings,” these cases do not involve 
government acquisition of title to the affected property.211 More 
properly understood as a deprivation of an interest in property protected 
by the Due Process Clause, regulatory takings demonstrate the extent 
to which the two clauses—Due Process and Takings—continue to 
influence one another. 
In one of the earliest cases to recognize a regulatory taking, 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,212 decided in 1922, the US Supreme 
Court struck down a statute that prohibited a mining company from 
removing coal that might cause a subsidence, damaging structures on 
the surface. Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
extended the traditional definition of “taking” by declaring that when 
the diminution of a property’s value “reaches a certain magnitude, in 
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain 
and compensation to sustain the act.”213 In short, he stated, “If 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”214 But only a 
few years later, in the 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co.,215 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted use and 
thereby lowered property values, making clear that regulations that 
diminish value to a lesser extent do not constitute a taking.216 
For the last century, the justices have struggled to determine when 
regulations go “too far.” At times, the Court has seemed inclined to 
favor “community rights” over individual ownership. In the leading 
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,217 decided in 
1978, it upheld a municipal regulation that prohibited a landowner from 
modifying a building deemed historic, emphasizing the building’s 
esthetic value to the public and denying that the owner had any 
“investment-backed expectations” of being permitted to change the use 
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of the property.218 More often than not, regulations are upheld unless 
they are so restrictive that they render the property essentially 
valueless.219 
Worries persisted that the rights of individual property owners 
were being sacrificed, and in 1982, the Court held that a regulation that 
required a “permanent physical occupation of property,” even of only 
a very small portion, for the benefit of other persons, was a prohibited 
taking.220 In a later case, the Court raised the prospect of damage 
awards for excessive regulation by holding that a property owner may 
be entitled to compensation for the temporary loss of use when 
restrictions on the use of property were later held to be invalid.221 
Expressive of the new judicial solicitude for the rights of property 
owners were decisions that invalidated certain conditions imposed on 
the grant of building permits.222 Today, the test is often whether the 
regulation appears to force “some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”223 
V. CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS 
What we have found is that the final appellate courts in all three 
jurisdictions have played and play a paramount role in balancing the 
interests of the community in the form of justice needs/costs and the 
individual right to private property However, while the Indian and 
Australian courts seem to favor the interests of the state/community 
over those of the individual—albeit for very different reasons—the US 
Supreme Court tends to side much more frequently with the holder of 
private property. As such, the individual right seems to have a priority 
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in American law not recognized in India and Australia. This results in 
very different placements along our Continuum for each of the three 
jurisdictions. 
Each of the three jurisdictions considered here reveal variable 
methods of balancing the need to meet justice costs with the protection 
of private property. In Diagram 2, we place the three jurisdictions along 
the Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property Continuum. The 
placement of each nation begins with its constitutional compulsory 
acquisition provision and is subject to movement based upon judicial 
and legislative interpretation and application of that provision. 
 
Diagram 2. Positions of India, Australia, and the United States on 
the Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property Continuum 
 
The United States focusses primarily on the limitation on the 
takings power, and treats it as an individual right, thereby establishing 
a broader ambit of protection to private property. Thus, while it might 
have started somewhere around the middle of the Continuum, as did 
Australia, judicial interpretation has pushed much further towards the 
protection of private property end. Armed with the power of judicial 
review and backed in many cases by a strong public commitment to 
property rights, the courts have enforced the constitutional restraints on 
the exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain. Property 
may be taken only for “public use” and with “just compensation.” 
Although the public use requirement was relaxed in the interest of 
facilitating improvements in infrastructure and in response to the 
government’s expansive exercise of its police power, the courts have 
remained vigilant in enforcing the requirement of just compensation. 
To prevent uncompensated government takings, the courts recognized 
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actions for inverse condemnation. And to prevent the uncompensated 
deprivation of property rights by excessive government regulations, the 
courts recognized regulatory takings and scrutinized the fairness of 
specific requirements. 
Australia provides seemingly extensive federal government 
control, focusing on the power compulsorily to acquire rather than the 
limitation on that power. While section 51(xxxi) would seemingly 
place the Australian position somewhere at the middle of the Justice 
Needs-Private Property Continuum, the consistent interpretation of the 
provision by the High Court, treating it as a strong grant of power, tends 
to move it in the direction of stronger provision for meeting justice 
costs. So, too, does the treatment of the limitation as acting to restrain 
legislative activity as opposed to an individual right, although some 
protection remains for private property when the exercise of such 
power enlivens the just terms guarantee. The High Court has 
accomplished this position through the use of a very wide definition of 
property coupled with a close textual reading of “just terms” and 
“purpose in respect of which” contained in section 51(xxxi), such that 
many acquisitions which would constitute a taking if dealt with in the 
United States, are considered acceptable adjustments of private 
property rights in Australia. This results in what might otherwise 
appear to a be a placement at the middle of our Continuum to an 
oscillation around the middle range of that Continuum, moving from 
greater protection for the interests of the community through the 
Commonwealth power compulsorily to acquire property to greater 
protection for individual private property, depending upon the purpose 
(pursuant to the exercise of a Commonwealth legislative power) in 
respect of which the property is acquired. 
India reveals a third position on the Continuum, close to that of 
Australia, but arrived at through the joint action of both the judicial and 
the legislative branches of the Indian federal government. What is 
unique about the Indian placement is that while the ostensible rationale 
for its position on the state power end—that such acquisitions are for 
public purposes—the true rationale is quite different: rather than for 
public purposes, the underlying reality behind such acquisitions is elite 
economic interest. India’s placement, then, demonstrates two important 
points about the Continuum. On the one hand, both the judiciary and 
the legislature can shift a jurisdiction’s position on the Continuum. 
More importantly, though, on the other hand, it demonstrates how such 
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shifts of position may appear to be for one reason, but in fact be for 
quite different purposes altogether. 
Examining and therefore placing India, Australia, and the United 
States along our Continuum proves a valuable exercise, for two 
reasons. First, and most obviously, it allows for a deeper consideration 
of the ways in which a state may act so as to meet the minimal justice 
requirements for its citizens through the re-distribution of private 
property. While we find that every state attempts to achieve some 
minimal level of justice in the allocation of goods and resources, the 
priority attached to this function, and the reasons given for exercising 
it, are often very different. This in turn has implications for the strength 
of a correlative individual right to private property. And, second, the 
exercise of plotting these three jurisdictions along our Continuum 
demonstrates how a similar exercise is possible with any state’s law of 
compulsory acquisition.  
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